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As a result of the recent economic crisis, in 2011 Portugal signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the European Central Bank, the European Commission and the 
International Monetary Fund (the 'Troika'). In exchange for Troika's financial 
assistance, the Memorandum required the implementation of a specific set of reforms 
targeted at the healthcare sector. The literature on policy reforms in the context of crisis 
and conditionality argues that governments have restricted room to maneuver in 
responding to external pressure. We challenge this view, finding that even in cases of 
conditionality and strong external pressures, crisis can be used as a window of 
opportunity for reforms substantially shaped by domestic policy choices. In the case of 
Portuguese health reforms, these choices were based on pre-existing reform plans aimed 
on resolving country-specific deficiencies of the healthcare system and were enabled by 
the two main political parties' strategies of tacit cooperation and blame avoidance. The 
article emphasizes the need for more fine-grained analysis of welfare reforms in the 
crisis that pays equal attention to the institutional characteristics and the political 
context of the affected countries. 
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Introduction 
In Portugal, as in other Southern European countries, healthcare reforms were recently 
introduced as part of large-scale reforms of the public sector in the context of a 
sovereign debt crisis (see Guillén and Pavolini 2015). Portugal stands out, along with 
Greece, as a country in which the healthcare reforms were characterized not only by 
deep austerity but also by strong external pressure and conditionality. With the signing 
of the Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality 
(MoU) by the so-called 'Troika' (International Monetary Fund, European Central Bank 
and European Commission) and the Portuguese government in 2011, in exchange for 
financial assistance, the country's leaders agreed to accept, among other things, more 
than 30 austerity measures targeting the healthcare sector. 
 This article investigates the ways the sovereign debt crisis affected healthcare 
reform in Portugal. It challenges the view prominent in the literature that policy change 
in the context of crisis should be seen as shaped largely by external pressure and 
conditionality. We argue that while both can trigger change, the interplay between these 
external and domestic factors – the institutional and political context of policy change - 
actually shapes the process of policy transformation. As we show, external pressure 
triggered the 2011 Portuguese healthcare reforms, and the Troika's financial assistance 
was conditional on the implementation of healthcare reforms. However, the reforms did 
not simply follow the dictates of the Troika. Instead, Portuguese policymakers used the 
crisis and Troika pressure as window of opportunity to introduce already existing plans 
for large-scale health reforms. The crisis offered an opportunity to resolve some of the 
problems generated by the specific institutional setup of the Portuguese healthcare 
system and the two main political parties took advantage of this, introducing the 
reforms through strategy of tacit cooperation and blame avoidance. Looking at the 
interplay of external pressure and domestic policy choices in the Portuguese case, we 
emphasize that welfare reforms in crisis have to be analyzed in a more fine-grained way 
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that pays attention to institutional characteristics and political context of the affected 
countries.  
 The article contributes to a better understanding of welfare state change in the 
context of economic crisis. The literature on policy change in Portugal in the recent 
economic crisis mainly analyzes the broader set of austerity measures introduced by the 
agreement with the Troika (Moury and Freire 2013; Moury and Standring 2017). In 
contrast, we look more closely at the dynamics of reform in one area, the healthcare 
sector, one of the country's largest welfare sectors and subject to the harshest austerity 
under the MoU.1 Theoretically, we rely on the existing argument that the crisis was used 
as a window of opportunity for reform (Moury and Standring 2017; see also Hopkin and 
Dubin 2013; Dukelow 2015). However, we extend this argument by explaining how not 
only political factors - elites' strategies of tacit cooperation and blame avoidance - but 
also institutional structures - fragmented character of the country's healthcare system 
that generated system-specific deficiencies - shaped the Portuguese healthcare reforms. 
In comparison to the existing studies that put forward the argument on external 
pressures as window of opportunity for Portuguese reforms (see Moury and Standring 
2017), the article provides more specific empirical support for this argument relying on 
interviews with policy makers and official policy documents related to healthcare 
reform. 
 The article uses both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include 
official policy documents on healthcare reforms, as well as 10 semi-structured 
interviews with public officials and healthcare policy experts conducted in Portugal in 
spring and summer 2016. The interview questions focused on healthcare policy and 
																																																								
1 For healthcare, the MoU envisaged savings of EUR 550 million, while savings for pensions and 
unemployment insurance were projected at EUR 445 million and EUR 150 million, respectively 
(European Commission 2011: 3). 
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reforms both before and during the global economic crisis. Secondary sources include 
newspaper articles, electoral results and statistical data.  
 The article is structured as follows. The first section outlines the theoretical 
framework of the article and specifies its core hypotheses. The second section briefly 
describes the historical development of the Portuguese healthcare system, showing how 
crisis and external pressure presented an opportunity to introduce large-scale reforms 
targeting some of the healthcare system's core deficiencies. The third section shows that 
the reforms were the results of the interplay between external pressure and domestic 
political choices, characterized by tacit inter-party cooperation and mutual blame 
avoidance. The last section summarizes the findings and provides some concluding 
reflections. 
 
Social Policy Reforms in the Context of Crisis 
In the context of the recent economic crisis, some of Europe's most economically 
vulnerable countries were pressured to accept external conditionality, whereby specific 
reforms were requested in exchange for financial assistance. As exposure to external 
conditionality was often associated with a high degree of social policy change, some 
scholars explain the crisis-related reforms in these countries as caused by external 
pressures (e.g. Stepan and Anderson 2014; Theodoropolou 2014; Helderman 2015; 
Baeten and Vanhercke 2017). This view assumes domestic factors, such as institutional 
or political context of reforms, play a minor role, or no role at all, in policy 
transformation. Rather than adjusting the crisis-driven measures to the existing 
institutions and policies, or having policymakers follow their political aims and 
strategies, in this view, social policy change is a response to the demands of external 
actors. The view also implies that crisis constrains domestic policy choice. As events 
over which policymakers have very little or no control, crisis and external pressure 
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constrain their room to maneuver, so the freedom of policy choice becomes severely, if 
not completely, restricted.  
 Following this view of social policy change, Stepan and Anderson (2014) 
analyze pension reforms in Greece and Hungary, two countries hard hit by the crisis. 
They claim the crisis provided international actors, notably the EU and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), a new framework to influence national governments, which 
involved making loans dependent on the fulfillment of specific criteria. The two 
countries introduced very specific pension reforms that would be unthinkable in the 
absence of external incentives and conditions set by the Troika had 'substantial 
influence' on both the direction and scope of their respective pension reforms (ibid. p. 
329-30; see also Anderson and Kaeding 2013). Focusing on Greece and Portugal, 
Theodoropolou (2014) similarly argues that the crisis and the accompanying MoUs 
changed the EU's potential to intrude into the reform of national social and labor market 
policy, with an 'unprecedentedly strong enforcement dimension' (ibid. p. 10). She finds 
the Troika measures had a high level of interference with objectives of national welfare 
policies, with the greater level of intrusiveness characteristic for more political or 
technical difficult reforms. Focusing specifically on healthcare in countries that signed a 
MoU with the Troika, Baeten and Vanhercke (2017) also argue that health reforms 
conditioned by financial assistance led to the EU's interference in national health 
systems and the emergence of a new EU role in healthcare (see also Helderman 2015; 
Vollaard and Martinsen 2017). 
 However, other literature on policy change in the context of crisis suggests the 
view of external factors as key determinants of change might not explain the variety of 
changes taking place or account for the domestic factors that continue to play a crucial 
role in policy transformation (e.g. Frisina-Doetter and Götze 2011; Pavolini and Guillén 
2013). Even in economically harsh times, when countries are vulnerable and face 
external pressure to reform, domestic realities, such as country and policy-specific 
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institutional and political context, can have a substantial influence on the scope, nature, 
and direction of policy change. The importance of existing institutional setups and 
political dynamics for crisis-driven social policy changes suggests policy-making is 
'path-dependent' and embedded in a specific context. This implies that even in times of 
crisis and external pressure, there is space for domestic policy choice as courses of 
action will be profoundly shaped by the country's institutional and political setting.  
 The research more specifically focused on healthcare policy change shows 
previous developments of healthcare system's institutions and policies can be crucial in 
shaping the content and scope of reforms even in the context of crisis (see Frisina-
Doetter and Götze 2011; Mladovsky et al. 2012; Pavolini et al. 2013; Stamati and 
Baeten 2015). In their analysis of healthcare reforms in Italy and the United Kingdom, 
Frisina-Doetter and Götze (2011) focus on particular characteristics of the National 
Health Service (NHS) systems in two countries, looking at their 'system-specific 
deficits' (see also Schmid et al. 2010).2 They find policy changes introduced during the 
crisis were essentially responses to systemic deficits typical for the NHS type healthcare 
systems, which included long waiting lists, insufficient investment in healthcare 
facilities and poor responsiveness. Similarly, Mladovsky and colleagues (2012) explain 
the diversity of crisis responses in the European healthcare sectors by showing that 
healthcare systems in some countries due to the previous policy choices were better 
prepared for the crisis than in others. Those having a more stable financial situation, i.e. 
less debt, were able to respond to the crisis by introducing smaller range of reforms than 
those with accumulated financial reserves.    
 Another important domestic factor in the explanation of social policy change is 
the political process. While a crisis can hit a country's economy hard, causing its 
																																																								
2 According to Schmid and colleagues (2010), healthcare systems have a tendency to feature deficiencies 
that are related to their institutional type. These deficiencies cannot be solved by routine mechanism but 
through implementation of innovative policies (ibid. p. 456). 
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international economic position to deteriorate and exposing it to external pressure to 
reform, policymaking in crisis is still strongly driven by internal political motivations 
and struggles. While the specific characteristics of the political dynamics will vary 
across countries, the literature on the politics of welfare reforms in the context of crisis 
suggests some cross-country patterns. One is the tendency of political elites to use a 
crisis as window of opportunity for reform, which can be particularly useful in 
healthcare, a sector characterized by pressure to introduce reforms that are both 
sensitive and unpopular (Frisina-Doetter and Götze 2011; Roubal 2012; Pavolini and 
Guillén 2013). A related strategy is blame avoidance, wherein political elites avoid 
responsibility for unpopular reforms by blaming others for them (Weaver 1986; Bonoli 
and Natali 2012). Political parties use blame avoidance to gain an advantage over other 
parties, but blame avoidance can also be used in the context of pressure for unpopular 
reforms coming from external actors, for example, international or supranational 
organizations. Domestic actors shift the blame to these actors and use them as 
scapegoats to further their own political agenda (Graziano et al. 2011). Generally 
speaking, then, domestic politics plays a crucial role even in the case of reforms and 
social policy changes introduced in the context of intense external pressure.  
 Based on the literature on the role of domestic factors in policy change during 
periods of crisis, we hypothesize that even in the context of conditionality marked by 
intense external pressure for reform, policy choice will be profoundly shaped by the 
country-specific institutional and political context. Focusing on Portuguese healthcare 
reforms, we formulate two specific arguments. The first is that the external pressure to 
reform the healthcare sector in exchange for financial assistance was used by 
policymakers as a window of opportunity to introduce previously politically unfeasible 
reforms aimed at problems caused by the fragmented structure of the Portuguese health 
sector. The second argument is that the capacity of policymakers to use external 
pressure as an opportunity for reform, i.e. the possibility of domestic choice, depended 
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on country-specific political dynamics, in this case, political elites' tacit inter-party 
cooperation and blame avoidance.  
 
External Pressures as Opportunity for Health Reforms 
In this section, we place the Portuguese healthcare reforms enacted under the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in the broader context of the country's 
healthcare system development. As we show, the MoU reforms were continuous with 
previous reform trends and represented gradual rather than radical change. In fact, the 
reforms were based on pre-crisis policy proposals targeting very particular system 
deficits caused by the fragmented structure of the Portuguese healthcare system. This 
provides support for our first argument: while crisis and external pressure triggered 
healthcare reform, these reforms were crafted domestically as policymakers used the 
crisis as an opportunity to introduce planned reforms aimed at solving system-specific 
problems.  
  
Evolution of the Portuguese Healthcare System  
The establishment of the National Health Service (NHS) marked the first phase (1979-
1989) in the evolution of the modern-day healthcare system in Portugal. The shift 
toward the NHS in 1979 introduced universal system of healthcare, ensuring access to 
healthcare as a social right. It also entailed dramatic changes in healthcare provision, 
mainly in terms of the ownership of healthcare facilities, most of which became public. 
In financing, changes were less radical because even though the NHS introduced 
universal coverage, some pre-existing social health insurance (SHI) schemes for 
specific occupational groups ('healthcare subsystems') were left untouched. In addition, 
voluntary private insurance was introduced during the 1980s (Barros et al. 2011). As a 
consequence, the transition to the NHS was incomplete (see Guillen 1999), resulting in 
a fragmented system combining NHS, SHI and private insurance elements. 
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 The second phase (1989-2001) was marked by a new policy paradigm based on 
the ideas of privatization and managed competition, aimed at achieving greater 
efficiency. In healthcare financing, private spending increased with the implementation 
of several new policies, including introduction of user fees (taxas moderadoras), tax 
allowance for private healthcare insurance spending, and an opt-out clause allowing 
individuals above a certain income level to pull out of NHS and opt for a private 
coverage. Far from improvement, the introduction of the private elements into the 
system magnified its already fragmented structure and threatened equality in healthcare 
access (Dixon and Mossialos 2000; Bentes et al. 2004; Oliveira and Pinto 2005).  
 Efforts to integrate the public and private sector marked the third phase (2001-
2008). This phase reinforced a paradigm openly unfavorable to the expansion of public 
spending and the strong role of the state (see Kanacos & McKee 1998). The reforms, 
focused on policies of cost-containment and adjustment of the public healthcare 
management according to a private management model, was expected to leverage 
efficiency gains and improve responsiveness to patient needs (Diogo 2004). Important 
changes during this phase were the introduction of contracting with the private sector 
and the emergence of hospitals based on public-private partnerships. 
 At the institutional level, the reforms introduced over several decades resulted in 
a fragmented system divided into three tiers. The first tier was the NHS, universally 
available, financed and operated by the public sector; the second was the SHI with 
schemes for specific occupations, and the third was a voluntary private health insurance, 
financed by individuals or third parties and subsidized by the state. This three-tier 
structure contributed to the system deficiencies as it created inequalities in healthcare 
access across population groups (Jamieson et al. 1990). In addition to universal 
coverage provided by the NHS, around 25 per cent of the population enjoyed coverage 
through the various occupational SHI schemes and private insurance plans (Barros et al. 
2011: 29), which offered easier access and greater choice of providers than the NHS 
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coverage. This specific structure of the Portuguese healthcare system was coupled with 
other deficiencies, including long waiting lists, major increases in expenditure, 
difficulties with cost-control, increased healthcare demands from vulnerable groups and 
dissatisfaction of both users and healthcare professionals (Bentes et al. 2004: 13). 
 Concern about the healthcare system led to new reform efforts after the 2005 
elections, when the left-wing government of the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista - PS) 
led by José Sócrates came into power (see table 1 in Appendix for government changes 
and healthcare reforms). In 2006, the Ministry of Health appointed a special 
Governmental Commission composed of healthcare experts and asked it to come up 
with reform proposals that would ensure the sustainability and efficiency of the 
healthcare system (Interview #2, #3). In June the following year, the Ministry of Health 
published Commission's report that pointed out the key problems of the healthcare 
system and indicated ten scenarios of system development with a list of reform 
recommendations (Ministry of Health 2007). These recommendations clearly targeted 
the system deficiencies, most of them focusing on reducing the cost of healthcare 
provision and inequalities in healthcare access, including measures such as revision of 
user fees, decrease in tax allowance for private healthcare spending and dismantling of 
the SHI schemes, the so-called 'subsystems' (ibid.).  
 However, it quickly became apparent that the government's reform proposal 
lacked political support. Even though the PS had managed to form a one-party majority 
government, the party itself was rife with internal conflict. One party stream was 
strongly leftist and opposed the reforms proposed by the Commission, while another 
was in favor. The main source of discord was the revision of user fees, as it re-opened 
debate on their constitutionality.3 At the same time, the reform lacked support from the 
																																																								
3 Revision of the Portuguese Constitution in 1989 changed the description of health services from “free of 
charge” to “approximately free of charge”. While this resulted in a prolonged discussion about the exact 
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stakeholders. The unions representing civil servants, insured through one of the SHI 
schemes, strongly opposed the idea of their dismantling (Interview #3, #4). Healthcare 
professionals also opposed the reforms, seeing them as a threat to their existing status 
allowing them to combine work in both the public and the private sector. As the 
political environment became more hostile to the reforms, the government began to see 
them as a problem. With elections approaching, it decided to shelve the Commission's 
proposal and leave it for the next politically opportune moment (Interview #4). 
  
Healthcare Reforms in the Context of Crisis  
At the outset of the financial crisis, the Portuguese healthcare sector was relatively 
unaffected, with anti-crisis measures focusing more broadly on the public sector 
workers. The more comprehensive healthcare reforms were introduced after the signing 
of the MoU between the Portuguese government and the Troika, on 17 May 2011. 
These reforms were strongly marked by austerity, as the MoU demanded cost control to 
achieve savings of €550 million (European Commission 2011: 3). The list of the 
measures expected to result in savings covered eight healthcare subsectors and 
contained more than 30 specific measures (ibid. pp. 17-20).  
 The MoU measures were focused mainly on cost-containment and on three main 
aspects of healthcare provision: changes in the system of financing, reorganization of 
primary care and hospital network, and changes in medicine pricing. A closer look on 
these measures reveals a number of striking similarities with the reforms proposed by 
the Governmental Commission in 2007 (see table 2 in the Appendix). One similarity is 
that both documents recommended revision and update of the existing system of user 
fees, stressing the need for changes in the eligibility criteria for fee exemptions (see 
																																																																																																																																																																		
meaning of the new term, the intention was to make clear that the Constitution did not preclude the 
existence of user fees in the NHS (see Barros et al. 2011).  
 
 12 
Barros 2012a). Another similarity was a provision to reduce the tax allowances for 
private healthcare spending. The MoU specified a reduction of 30 to 10 per cent of total 
personal private health spending and envisaged the termination of the allowances for 
those in upper income brackets. Furthermore, like the Commission, the MoU envisaged 
changes in the 'subsystems'. Measures focused on the financial stabilization and 
autonomy of the largest SHI fund, for civil servants (Direcção Geral de Protecção 
Social aos Funcionários e Agentes da Administração Pública - ADSE), and other two 
funds covering police and military personnel (Assistência na Doença da Policia de 
Segurança Pública - SAD, Assistência na Doença aos Militares - ADM). The plan was 
to reduce the costs of the funds by lowering the employer’s, i.e. the state's contribution 
rate, and adjusting the scope of benefits (Sakellarides et al. 2015: 295). 
 Also echoing the Commission’s recommendations, the MoU measures targeted 
pharmaceutical spending, including such changes as the promotion of the use of generic 
medicines, redefinition of the pricing methodology, stricter regulation and monitoring 
of prescriptions, centralization of purchasing and procurement system and increase in 
competition among private providers (Barros 2012b: 34).  
Finally, both envisaged similar changes in healthcare delivery. While the 
Commission focused on investment in primary care, improvement of gatekeeping and 
changes in hospital networks, the MoU planned an increase in the number of family 
health units, reorganization of hospital networks, settlement of hospital arrears, and 
establishment of a benchmarking system for hospital performance (Table 2, see also 
Sakellarides et al. 2015).  
   
External Pressures and Political Strategies 
The striking similarity between the 2007 Commission’s proposal for health reforms and 
the 2011 MoU measures suggests that the Troika's pressure represented an opportunity 
to introduce an already existing reform plan that aimed on resolving specific 
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deficiencies of the Portuguese healthcare system. But, why were Portuguese healthcare 
reforms possible in 2011 but not in 2007? In this section, we provide support for our 
second argument showing that the reforms were enabled by two consciously chosen 
political strategies of the Portuguese political elites: one was tacit cooperation between 
the country's two main political parties and  another was their use of blame avoidance. 
  
Portugal's External Pressures 
At the beginning of the crisis,  the Portuguese government led by Socialist Prime 
Minister José Sócrates (PS) responded to some of the first crisis effects with an 
expansionary social policy. However, as these led to spending increases, the policy 
shifted to austerity (Zartaloudis 2014), with three specific austerity packages applied 
across the public sector. The first two packages, introduced in Spring 2010, targeted 
social benefits of public sector workers, including a replacement of obligatory with 
voluntary membership in the largest social insurance fund, for civil servants (ADSE). 
The third package, which was tied to the 2011 budget, affected public sector workers 
and therefore also the NHS staff. It implied freezes and cut in public sector salaries, and 
reductions in spending on pensions and social benefits. At the same time, however, the 
package also included some expansionary elements, for example, an increase in tax 
allowance for private healthcare insurance spending (Table 1; see also Afonso et al. 
2015). 
 The austerity packages were used to demonstrate the willingness of the 
country’s leaders to stay on the austerity path and were the government's attempt to 
avoid international financial support. However, at the beginning of 2011, a set of new 
reports reinforced the market sentiment that international financial assistance was 
unavoidable (see Lourtie 2011). Under mounting pressure, in April 2011, Sócrates 
announced that the country was facing bankruptcy and would request financial 
assistance from the Troika. This led to the signing of the MoU in May. 
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Political Strategies: Inter-Party Cooperation and Blame Avoidance 
Reforms introduced under the MoU, including the healthcare reforms, were triggered by 
external pressure but shaped by Portugal's domestic politics. Political management of 
the crisis was characterized by two country-specific factors. The first was the tacit  
cooperation between the two main political parties, the left-wing Socialist Party 
(Partido Socialista - PS) and the right-wing Social Democratic Party (Partido Social 
Democrata - PSD) and the second was their use of blame avoidance.  
 As aforementioned, the PS initiated austerity measures from 2005 to 2008, 
under a majority government headed by Sócrates. During its 2009 election campaign, 
the PS seemed to be back on its ideological track and was campaigning for a stimulus 
approach. However, in the September elections neither the PS nor the PSD won a 
majority, with 97 and 81 out of 230 parliamentary seats respectively, but the PS 
managed to form a minority government (Table 1). 
 The PS's minority government introduced a set of expansionary policies, but 
then quickly shifted back to austerity with the three austerity packages mentioned 
above. It had broken its pre-election promises, but it justified the move as an attempt to 
save the country by calming the international markets and resisting external financial 
assistance. While the 'salvation' plans introduced under the PS government were radical, 
the government's minority status meant that they could be instated only with the 
informal support of the PS's strongest political opponent, the PSD. This was not an 
entirely new phenomenon. Tacit cooperation between the PS and the PSD had started in 
2009, when the PSD, together with the other opposition party, Christian Democratic 
Party - People's Party (Partido do Centro Democrático Social – Partido Popular - CDS-
PP), offered passive support for the austerity measures during the parliamentary debates 
over the 2010 budget. More specifically, the PSD promised to let the budget pass by 
abstaining from the vote in exchange for concessions in the timing of fiscal 
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consolidation. The cooperation continued during the introduction of the three austerity 
packages. The first package, in March 2010, was negotiated with the PSD, and the PSD 
enabled its passage by again abstaining from the vote. The second package, adopted a 
month later, was also jointly agreed upon by Sócrates and the new PSD leader, Pedro 
Passos Coelho. The third austerity plan, which was tied to the 2011 budget, was 
reluctantly supported by the PSD and was passed in Parliament despite a lack of support 
from other opposition parties (Afonso et al. 2015: 323-4). 
 However, a fourth austerity package failed to pass in Parliament in March 2011. 
The PSD argued it was not negotiated with the opposition, and it withdrew its support. 
The other opposition parties followed suit. The government's failure to pass this 
austerity package resulted in Sócrates' resignation, and new elections were called in 
early June. 
In the meantime, the external pressure on Portugal was growing with the 
realization that the country would not be able to meet its debt obligations. Accordingly, 
the country accepted the Troika's bailout package and signed the MoU. The MoU 
measures specifically targeting the healthcare sector were clearly based on the 2007 
reform proposal and were readily agreed upon by the caretaker socialist government and 
the Troika experts, with the political support of the PSD (Interview #1, #3). The 
measures were proposed to a large extent by Portuguese officials and were 
characterized by an easily reached consensus between the two main parties. Consensus 
was easy because most of the measures had already been discussed in policymaking 
circles (Interview #2, #3, #6). The MoU was signed by the PS and the PSD, as well as 
by the CDS-PP, the third strongest party. The cooperation of the PSD was not seen as 
surprising because, at the time of the signing of the Memorandum, it looked like the 
most probable winner of the upcoming elections, implying that implementation of 
reform could not take place without its support (see Magalhães 2012). The PSD 
cooperation was even more obvious when, after winning the June election by a 
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convincing margin over the PS, it formed a government together with the CDS-PP and 
promptly started implementing the MoU measures (Interview #8).   
 The cooperation between the parties was initially justified by national interests. 
Shortly before signing the MoU, Sócrates stated: 'What the country certainly hopes is 
that this time the sense of responsibility will prevail, as well as the sense of higher 
national interest that we all must defend' (Visão 2011). Nevertheless, the discourse of 
cooperation quickly shifted to one of blame avoidance. Before the bailout, the PS 
assigned blame for the country's dire conditions to the global financial markets and 
international rating agencies. After signing the MoU, it shifted blame to the PSD, 
claiming that the acceptance of the MoU measures was unavoidable because the PSD 
had not supported the last austerity package (see Magalhães 2012; Financial Times 
2014). Sócrates also sought to shift his party's responsibility for signing the MoU by 
stressing that the support of the opposition parties was crucial for the Troika measures 
to be accepted (Jornal de Notícias 2011a). During the election campaign and once the 
PSD formed a coalition government (with CDS-PP) after June 2011 elections and 
started implementing the measures, the finger pointing continued, with the PS accusing 
the PSD of destroying the NHS (Jornal de Notícias 2011b; Interview #5, #7) and 
arguing that harsh austerity measures in the healthcare sector were 'going beyond the 
Troika measures' (Publico 2014a; Interview #8).  
The PSD was involved in blame avoidance as well. The PSD-CDS-PP 
government, led by PSD's leader Pedro Passos Coelho, implemented the MoU measures 
but continued to accuse the previous, PS government of causing the country's problems, 
while emphasizing the limited room to maneuver in the context of the Troika measures 
(Publico 2011). The new Minister of Health, Paulo Macedo, also denied the PS 
accusation that the PSD government was going beyond the Troika measures and was 
simply applying 'blind cuts' in the healthcare sector (Publico 2014b).  
 Both the PS and the PSD were able to use the blame avoidance strategy because 
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the inter-party cooperation during the introduction of austerity packages and the signing 
of the MoU had blurred the issue of responsibility (see Magalhães 2012; Interview #9, 
#10). As the second Sócrates government was a minority government, it needed PSD 
help to pass its austerity plans, but the cooperation was never really open. The signing 
of the MoU by both parties and the change of power from the PS to the PSD 
immediately after the MoU further obscured the responsibility issue and enabled the 
two parties to easily shift the blame for the healthcare reforms to one another. The 
relative success of the parties' blame avoidance strategies was confirmed by the results 
of the June 2011 elections. Although the PSD won, the PS came second and kept about 
30 per cent of the seats in the Parliament (Döring and Manow 2018). 
 
Conclusion 
This article analyzed Portugal's healthcare policy reforms in the context of the recent 
financial crisis. We argued that external pressure led to the signing of the Memorandum 
of Understanding with the Troika and triggered the reforms, but policymakers used the 
crisis as an opportunity to implement already planned structural reforms, targeting very 
specific deficiencies of the Portuguese healthcare system. The effective use of the crisis 
was also enabled by country-specific political factors. One was the tacit cooperation of 
the two main political parties, the PS and the PSD, and another was the use of a blame 
avoidance strategy that enabled each party to shift blame for the unpopular healthcare 
austerity measures to the other.  
 Our findings are in line with existing research showing that even in the context 
of intense external pressure for reform, as in the recent economic crisis, policy change is 
shaped by the domestic context, and that agency remains an important aspect of policy 
change (Dukelow 2015; Fonseca and Ferreira 2015; Moury and Standring 2017). As the 
Portuguese case illustrates, the policymakers signed the MoU specifying that in return 
for a financial bailout, they would make reforms, but they turned this conditionality into 
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an opportunity to enact previously proposed reforms that were politically unfeasible. 
This shift from conditionality to opportunity, as we show, was enabled by the strategies 
of the main political parties - tacit cooperation and blame avoidance.  
 We believe these findings can stimulate further research. Our findings are in line 
with the literature that points to the role of institutions (Frisina-Doetter and Götze 2011; 
Pavolini et al. 2013; Stamati and Baeten 2015) as its shows that the fragmented 
institutional character of the Portuguese healthcare system explains the incentives of 
domestic actors to agree on policy change. Nevertheless, they also point to the need for 
research on how other types of institutions, e.g. political institutions, in the context of 
crisis and external pressure for policy change interact with policymakers, creating 
politically opportune moments for implementation of difficult welfare reforms. 
 The findings from the Portuguese case also reveal that certain pre-conditions, 
such as existence of Government's reform plan, need to be in place in order for 
policymakers to use the crisis as window of opportunity. They also point to the need for 
the agreement of policy goals between the external and domestic policy actors. Further 
research on the relationship between external and domestic policy goals that compares 
Portugal with other countries, especially those in which crisis was not coupled with 
policy change, could shed more light on the conditions under which crisis can be used 
as an opportunity for change. 
In addition, our findings on tacit cooperation are in line with the research 
showing that policymaking during the Portuguese crisis involved collaboration between 
main political actors  (see Afonso et al. 2015; Giorgi et al. 2015), but further research 
on policy preferences in the context of crisis would yield valuable insights into what 
makes this collaboration possible. The recent work by Giger and Nelson (2011) on the 
electoral consequences of retrenchment politics and work by Jensen (2014) on the 
similarity of parties' policy preferences in specific welfare sectors such as healthcare 
could be particularly useful in this respect. 
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 Lastly, our findings on the use of blame avoidance in the context of externally 
conditioned reforms back up previous literature on the use of Europe as a scapegoat in 
welfare state change linked to social, political and economic costs (see Graziano et al. 
2011; Zartaloudis 2013). However, further research is needed to clarify when and why 
specific strategies on the use of Europe become attractive in the domestic context of 
political competition. Recent work by Magalhães and colleagues (2016) points to the 
gap between the Portuguese elites’ opinion of Europe and the general public's opinion, 
with the public becoming less pro-European than the elites. This interesting finding 
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Table 1. Healthcare reforms and governments in Portugal 2007-2015. 
 
Reform measure or proposal  
 
Law number and date 






Parties in the Government 









Commission Report 22.06.2007 
(published) 
n/a PS (Sócrates) Majority Centre-Left 
Enrolment in ADSE (social health insurance for civil servants) 
becomes optional. 
Law n.º 3-B/2010, 
28.04.2010 
29.04.2010 PS (Sócrates) Minority Centre-Left 
Salary freezes and reductions for NHS staff and freezes in the pay-
for-performance payments. 
Law n.º 55-A/2010,  
31.12.2010 
01.01.2011 PS (Sócrates) Minority  Centre-Left 
Introduction of 30% tax deduction for private healthcare insurance 
spending. 
Law n.º  55-A/2010,  
31.12.2010 
01.01.2011 PS (Sócrates) Minority  Centre-Left 
MoU – Memorandum of Understanding 17.05.2011 
(signed) 
n/a PS (Sócrates) Minority Centre-Left 
Revision of the pricing system for pharmaceuticals and promotion of 
the use of generic medicines. 
Decree-Law n.º 112/2011, 
29.11.2011 
01.01.2012 PSD, CSD-PP (Passos 
Coelho) 
Majority  Centre-Right 
Increase in user fees and revision of the existing rules for fees 
exemptions.  
Decree-Law n.º 113/ 
2011, 29.11.2011 
01.01.2012 PSD, CSD-PP (Passos 
Coelho) 
Majority  Centre-Right 
Elimination of tax deductions for private healthcare spending for the 
top two income brackets. 
Reduction of tax deductions for private healthcare insurance 
spending from 30% to 10%. 




PSD, CSD-PP (Passos 
Coelho) 
Majority Centre-Right 
Exemption of the unemployed from the user fees. 
 
Decree-Law n.º 128/2012, 
30.12.2011 
22.06.2012 PSD, CSD-PP (Passos 
Coelho) 
Majority  Centre-Right 
Increase of employee contribution for the social health insurance 
(SHI) from 1.5 to 2.25% of the salary. 
Decree-Law n.º 105/2013, 
30.07.2013 
31.07.2013 PSD, CSD-PP (Passos 
Coelho) 
Majority  Centre-Right 
Increase in employee contributions for SHI from 2.25% to 3.5% of Decree-Law n.º  30/2014, 20.05.2014 PSD, CSD-PP (Passos Majority  Centre-Right 
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salary. 19.05.2014 Coelho) 
Salary freezes and reductions for NHS staff. Law n.º  82-B/2014, 
31.12.2014 
01.01.2015 PSD, CSD-PP (Passos 
Coelho) 
Majority  Centre-Right 
 
Increase in the number of family health units. 
 
Decree-Law n.º  
223/2015, 08.10.2015 
9.10.2015 PSD, CSD-PP (Passos 
Coelho) 
Majority  Centre-Right 








Table 2. Comparison of selected recommendations by the Commission Report and measures by the Memorandum of Understanding. 
Policy 
Aspect/Document 
2007 Commission Report  2011 Memorandum of Understanding 
Cost-control Achieve greater efficiency in the provision of 
healthcare, implemented either through a lower 
expenditure, or by a lower growth rate of public 
expenditure on health.  
Control costs in health sector on the basis of detailed measures listed below under 'Health-care 
system', achieving savings worth EUR 550 million. 
User fees Update user fees (taxas moderadoras) as a discipline 
measure for excessive use of the NHS. Revision of 
Review and increase user fees (taxas moderadoras) through: i) substantial revision of existing 
exemption categories, including stricter means-testing; ii) increase of fees in certain services; 
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the current regime of exemptions from user fees, with 
a redefinition of the exemptions based on two 
criteria: capacity to pay and the need for continuing 
healthcare. 
iii) legislate automatic indexation of fees to inflation. 
Tax allowances Reduce the tax benefits associated with the health 
expenditure, approaching the practice observed in 
most OECD countries. 
Cut allowances from a maximum of 30 % to 10 % of private healthcare spending. Cancellation 
of tax allowances for upper income categories. 
Subsystems Remove the budget space of the public subsystems, 
considering possible evolution of their elimination or 
financial self-sustainability. 
Reduce budgetary costs of the healthcare subsystems (ADSE, ADM and SAD) by lowering the 
employer's contribution and adjusting the scope of healthcare benefits, by 20 % in 2012 and 
further 20 % in 2013. 
Pharmaceuticals Control of the rising costs of pharmaceuticals, 
including changes in reimbursement system of drugs, 
extending the list of medicines without prescription, 
introduction of lists of reference prices, encouraging 
the use of generics, positive lists of medicines for 
reimbursement, and extension of list of drugs subject 
to authorization consumption. 
Set the maximum price of the first generic introduced in the market to 60% of the branded 
product with similar active substance. Revise the existing reference-pricing system. Make 
electronic prescription covered by public reimbursement compulsory in both the public and 
private sector. Improve the monitoring system of prescription of medicines. Induce both 
private and public physicians to prescribe generic medicines. Establish clear rules for the 
prescription. Remove all effective entry barriers for generic medicines. 
Primary care  Aspects that should be reinforced are investments in 
primary care services and its gate-keeping function. 
Reinforce primary care services so as to further reduce unnecessary visits to specialists and 
emergencies and to improve care coordination through: i) increasing the number of USF 
(Unidades de Saúde Familiares) units contracting with regional authorities (ARSs); ii) setting-
up a mechanism to guarantee the presence of family doctors in needed areas to induce a more 
even distribution. 
Hospitals Revise the hospital network. 
 
 
Set out timetable to clear all arrears. Reduce hospital operation costs for €200 million by 2012, 
thorough management concentration and hospital mergers. Reorganize and rationalize the 
hospital network through specialization and concentration of hospital and emergency services 
and joint management. Establish a system for comparison of hospital performance 
(benchmarking) on the basis of a comprehensive set of indicators. 
Sources: Ministry of Health (2007) and European Commission (2010: 17-20). 
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